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1 Introduction
Human social interactions are strongly shaped by social preferences, with evidence from both the
laboratory and the field suggesting that such preferences have implications in a range of settings. Pre-
vious research shows that prosocial preferences influence outcomes in social dilemmas (Fischbacher
& Ga¨chter, 2010), charitable giving (DellaVigna et al., 2012; Falk, 2007) and could even play a role
in labour markets and natural competitive market places (Bellemare & Shearer, 2009; Grosskopf &
Pearce, 2016; Kube et al., 2012, 2013), affecting welfare distributions and market efficiency (Dufwen-
berg et al., 2011).1,2
There is also evidence that individuals’ concern for others depends on the identity of the person
with whom they are interacting (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000; Chen & Li, 2009). For example, there is
evidence that subjects behave more charitably (Chen & Li, 2009), cooperatively (Bran˜as–Garza et al.,
2006; Chen et al., 2014; Drouvelis & Nosenzo, 2013) and coordinate more efficiently (Chen & Chen,
2011) when interacting with the ‘in–group’, i.e. someone they identify with, in comparison to the
‘out–group’. Findings from natural field experiments corroborate these results, with evidence showing
that individuals condition their other–regard on the ethnicity of the person they are interacting with
(Grosskopf & Pearce, 2016; Mujcic & Frijters, 2013). Bernhard et al. (2006) refer to these types
of group biases as parochialism. As it has been argued that social preferences are a ‘fundamental
cornerstone’ of humans’ ability to cooperate with genetic strangers (Fehr et al., 2013), understanding
the extent to which they are contingent on the ethnicity of others and how this dependency develops,
is crucial for the design of institutions and their associated incentives in increasingly diverse societies.
Using a unified framework of mini–dictator games, Fehr et al. (2008) examine how altruism,
egalitarianism and spite emerge alongside parochialism in children aged 3 to 8 years old. Fehr
et al. (2013) expand on this by investigating these behaviours in 8 to 17 year olds using the same
experimental design. Both Fehr et al. (2008) and Fehr et al. (2013) examine parochialism using small,
‘interpersonal social groups’ (Brewer & Gardner, 1996) by varying the school from which the person
receiving the money in the dictator games is selected. The receiver is either from the same school as
the dictator (the ‘in–group’), or a different school (the ‘out–group’). Both studies report evidence of
in–group favouritism that increases with age, with subjects behaving more altruistic and less spiteful
towards in–group members in comparison to out–group members. However, defining the in–group in
this way introduces a potential confound stemming from repeated interactions that could be present
when people interact with those that they may be able recognise (List, 2006). Therefore, it may not
be surprising that in–group favouritism is found to increase with age. It may be that each additional
year of schooling increases a child’s experience with the same peers, potentially resulting in long–
term relationships with peers from the same school. In addition, relatively little is known about how
these behaviours develop with age later in the life cycle, especially in adulthood. As perceived senses
of identity can act as mechanisms that promote, or impede, coordination and cooperation in the
workplace, understanding the interaction between age, social preferences and identity, is increasingly
important, especially as the working population grows older and becomes more diverse. Our study
addresses both of these concerns.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we study how social preferences develop with age,
with an extension to include the relatively understudied subject pool of adults. Second, we examine
whether and how group biases are manifested in the behaviour of different age groups. This is
done using an artefactual field experiment conducted in Granada, Spain, with 665 subjects aged 9
to 67. Utilising mini–dictator games we exploit the unifying framework of Fehr et al. (2008) and
1See Camerer & Fehr (2004) and Cooper & Kagel (2009) for comprehensive reviews of the laboratory literature.
2We note that there is mixed evidence on reciprocity in the field. See for example Gneezy & List (2006) and List
(2006).
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Fehr et al. (2013) and categorise subjects from four distinct age groups, Children (aged 9 to 11),
Teenagers (aged 15 to 18), Students (aged 18 to 28) and Adults (aged 31 to 67), into one of three
behavioural types: altruistic, egalitarian and spiteful. Following Fehr et al. (2008) and Fehr et al.
(2013), dictators were shown a photo of a group of receivers, one of whom they would be matched
with at random. We examine group biases by varying the ethnicity of the individuals in the photos:
Arab (Morocco), Black (Senegal), East–Asian (China) and White (Spain). We refer to interactions
between dictators and White receivers as in–group interactions, and interactions between dictators
and receivers from other ethnic groups as out–group interactions. From the perspective of Fehr et al.
(2008, 2013), all our interactions could be viewed as out–group, with the out–groups differing in
geographical, cultural and economic distance. However, we refer to in–group interactions as those in
which individuals share ethnic appearance characteristics, but in which individuals are still strangers.
This follows what Brewer & Gardner (1996) call collective rather than interpersonal identity, and
addresses the problem of potential repeated interaction effects.
We report a number of observations. First, we observe that for Children, Teenagers and Students,
egalitarianism diminishes as they grow older, while altruism increases. In contrast, we find that
for Adults, egalitarianism becomes more prominent with age whilst altruism diminishes. Second,
following the analysis of Fehr et al. (2008), we report gender differences in egalitarianism emerging
in Children and persisting through to adulthood, whilst this differential emerges later for altruistic
types, being found in Teenagers. Finally, we report no evidence of favouritism towards the White
in–group receivers. Instead, we find that all age groups are more likely to be altruistic when the
receiver is Black, except the Adults who do not differentiate based on the receivers’ ethnicity. For
this age group, we report no evidence of group–contingent behavioural types (Chen & Li, 2009).
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, through the inclusion of Adults, we
are able to identify two relationships that had previously gone unnoticed, and appeared linear: a ‘U–
shaped’ relationship between age and egalitarianism; and an inverse ‘U–shaped’ relationship between
age and altruism. This complements previous work by List (2004), who finds that contributions in
a one shot public goods game are increasing with age. It also provides an informative comparison
with House et al. (2013), who report a U–shaped relationship between age and egalitarian choices
appearing at a much younger age, i.e. in children aged 3 to 14. While these results seem different
to ours, they are obtained in experimental settings where children mostly knew one another, and
were incentivised with candy. Second, while previous findings mostly stemming from ultimatum
and dictator games have shown that females are more generous than men, we observe that females
become more egalitarian with age. Third, our use of a broader sense of identity that considers a larger
geographical area to be regarded as the in–group, complements the previous research that studies a
narrower sense of identity. In doing so we overcome a potential repeated interaction confound that
may be present in previous work.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives details of the experimental
design and procedure. Section 3 outlines and discusses the results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Experimental design and procedure
The experiment is designed to examine how social preferences and group biases develop with age.
This is done using an artefactual field experiment in which we examine behaviour in a range of mini–
dictator games. To examine group biases we use a between–subject design in which we exogenously
vary the ethnicity of the receivers with whom the dictators are matched.
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Receivers’ Ethnicity
Subjects’ Age Range White Arab E.Asian Black Total
Children 9-11 51 47 47 33 178
Teenagers 15-18 52 54 48 49 203
Students 18-28 39 45 50 50 184
Adults 31-67 29 26 23 22 100
Total 171 172 168 154 665
Table I: Experimental Design Summary
2.1 Design
The experiment draws dictators from four distinct age groups: Children aged 9 to 11, Teenagers
aged 15 to 18, Students aged 18 to 28 and Adults aged 31 to 67.3 The Children and Teenagers
were recruited from private, coeducational schools in Granada, Spain.4 Students were recruited from
the experimental subject pool of the University of Granada, and Adults were recruited from the
professional staff at the University of Granada.5
Variation in the ethnic identity of the receiver was achieved by showing the dictators a photo of
a group of people, one of whom they would be matched with and would act as a receiver to their
choices for the duration of the experiment. The ethnicity of the people in the photo was varied by
their country of residence: Arab (Morocco), Black (Senegal), East–Asian (China) or White (Spain).
Dictators were not informed about the particular country in which the photo was taken, but were told
that the recipients were from a foreign country.6 The receivers in the photos were always strangers
and from the same age group as the dictators.7 The photos contained both males and females.
We selected receivers from these particular countries for a number of reasons. As all our dictators
were recruited from the University of Granada, receivers from Spain were selected to serve as a
natural ‘in–group’ comparison. The other countries were selected in order to vary the ethnicity of
the receivers, and thus the extent to which the dictators may perceive them as out–group. Appearance
differences were apparent from the photos, with the receivers from Spain looking most similar to the
dictators. Receivers from the other countries differed in appearance to the dictators in their skin
tone, hair colour, and facial features. Table I presents the number of observations obtained from each
treatment for each age group. All experimental materials are given in Appendix A.
2.2 Procedure
Subjects played as dictator in three mini–dictator games taken from Fehr et al. (2008): the Pro–social
Game, the Envy Game and the Sharing Game. As the experiments were conducted in a similar
manner to the majority of studies that conduct dictator games, our methodology is comparable
3Although our results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables, we acknowledge that age has not
been randomly assigned in our experiment.
4Consent was obtained from the children, the children’s parents and the participating schools.
5To ensure the comparability of subjects of different age groups, we endeavoured to recruit from populations that
had been educated in similar institutions. Of our sample, 66% of the Students and 74% of Adults attended a similar
primary school to our sample of Children. Further, 81% of Students and 81% of Adults attended a secondary school
similar to our Teenagers. 57% of Adults has obtained a university degree.
6Dictators were not told this when the receiver was from Spain.
7To ensure that no dictator potentially knew a receiver, Children and Teenagers interacted with their counterparts
from different schools, Students interacted with other students from different subject areas and year groups, and Adults
interacted with staff from different colleges.
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Figure 1: Dictator Games
to the previous literature (see Engel (2011) for a recent meta–analysis of previous dictator game
studies). Figure 1 displays the three experimental games graphically. In each game, subjects had to
choose between two possible actions: left and right. The action left always resulted in an egalitarian
allocation of (5,5) - 5 points for the dictator and 5 points for the receiver. The allocation resulting
from right is systematically varied between games and the order in which the games were completed
was randomised.
In the Pro–social Game, the action right results in an allocation of (5,0) - 5 points for the dictator
and 0 points for the receiver. This game allows the dictator to avoid advantageous inequality without
incurring a cost, and serves to measure the dictator’s willingness to avoid it. Choosing left could stem
from a preference to avoid inequalities (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999), from efficiency concerns (Charness
& Rabin, 2002) or from the desire to maximize the minimum payoff. A self–interested individual is
indifferent between either choice. In the Envy Game the action right produces an allocation of (5,10),
and serves to provide a measure of the dictator’s willingness to costlessly lower the receiver’s payoff,
reducing disadvantageous inequality. In the Sharing Game, a choice of right produces an allocation
of (10,0). Choosing the egalitarian choice in the Sharing Game is costly for the dictator, in contrast
to the Pro–social Game, which would show a strong form of inequality aversion.
These games were chosen because the actions taken in each game, when considered collectively, can
be used to determine the motives underpinning each dictator’s decisions. Following the classifications
of Fehr et al. (2008, 2013), each dictator can be categorised as an altruistic, egalitarian or spiteful
behavioural type, with strong and weak sub–types, depending on the dictators’ choice pattern. Table
II outlines these classifications in detail. We acknowledge that, as with the studies of Fehr et al. (2008,
2013), a perfectly selfish individual would randomise between left and right in the Pro–social and
Envy Games, but select right in the Sharing game, and thus may appear as Weakly Altruistic,
Weakly Egalitarian or Spiteful. To address this, we have examined the data to see if we observe
similar proportions of Weakly Altruistic, Weakly Egalitarian and Spiteful types. Formally testing
this, we can reject the null hypothesis that these proportions are equal (p < 0.001, χ2 Test, d.f =2).
In each game, 1 point corresponds to e1, an exchange rate that was employed for all age groups.
We did not want to introduce a potential confound by varying the incentives by age (toys, stickers or
sweets as incentives for the Children, and money for the other age groups) as there is evidence that
non–monetary incentives result in significantly more pro–social behaviours (see Fehr et al. (2008)
versus Fehr et al. (2013)). A similar result is also observed by Moore (2009). This is likely a
consequence of sharing norms associated with food and sweets, or different responses to different
reward types (House & Tomasello, 2018).8
8Although asking subjects to make multiple decisions may induce moral balancing or licensing, this should be present
across all age groups and in all treatments, and as such is independent of age and the in/out–group manipulation.
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Behavioural Type Pro–social Envy Sharing
Strongly Egalitarian (5,5) (5,5) (5,5)
Weakly Egalitarian (5,5) (5,5) (10,0)
Strongly Altruistic (5,5) (5,10) (5,5)
Weakly Altruistic (5,5) (5,10) (10,0)
Spiteful (5,0) (5,5) (10,0)
Note: Behavioural types are taken from Fehr et al.
(2008).
Table II: Behavioural Types
3 Results
In this section, we outline the experimental results. A number of common features are present
throughout. Where non–parametric tests are utilised, both the p–value and test used are presented
in parentheses. All tests are two sided, unless otherwise stated. All parametric support is obtained
from marginal effects estimated from Probit regressions. Tables presenting full regressions are given
in Appendix B. We present the results relating to social preferences in Section 3.1 and analyse group
biases in Section 3.2.
3.1 Social Preferences
The analysis focuses on each subject’s choice pattern across the three games, rather than considering
the subjects’ choices from each game separately. This enables us to interpret each subject’s behaviour
within the Fehr et al. (2013) framework, and keeps the analysis concise. We first categorise subjects
into each of the behavioural types, as specified in Table II. Figure 2a presents the distribution of
these types, showing the percentage of subjects categorised for each age group. Pooling the weak and
strong subtypes, Figure 2b plots the percentage of subjects categorised into three broad categories.
Table III presents the estimates of marginal effects from Probit regressions, where in each regres-
sion the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the subject has
been classified into one of the behavioural types - egalitarian in regression (i), altruistic in (ii) and
spiteful in (iii).
In each regression we include the following variables: the subjects’ age in years, the subjects’ age
in years squared, a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the subject is female, the interaction
between the subjects’ gender and their age, and a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the interaction
is in–group (i.e. the receiver is from Spain). We include age squared in the regressions in order to
capture any non–linear effects associated with age. The interaction between the subjects’ gender
and their age is included to account for gender differences that might emerge over time. Finally, we
include an in–group dummy in order to account for any in–group/out–group effects that the literature
has previously found to be important.9
Following Fehr et al. (2008), we focus the analysis on the marginal effect of the variable Age,
which is the subjects’ age in years, and then on the marginal effect of Female, the dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if the subject is female. We estimate the marginal effect of both these variables
for each age group. The age brackets themselves are not included in the regressions. The coefficient
estimates are therefore not the level effect of being in one of these age brackets, but the estimated
9All our estimates are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. These estimates can be found in Table
VII, Appendix B.
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effect of increasing age by one year (or being female), at the empirical mean of the respective age
group. Figure 3a and Figure 3b plot the estimated marginal effects of age and female graphically.
In addition to following the methodology of Fehr et al. (2008), we also estimate a multinomial logit
model to examine the robustness of our results. We estimate the model using the same explanatory
variables as those used in the Probit models, but allow for three unordered outcomes rather than
using a binary dependent variable. The estimates of log–odds of age, age squared and the gender
dummy are presented in Table IV.
Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
(i) (ii) (iii)
Marginal Effect of Age:
Children -0.037*** 0.033*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Teenagers -0.034*** 0.037*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Students -0.025*** 0.029*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Adults 0.025*** -0.027*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001)
Marginal Effect of Female:
Children 0.096** -0.045 -0.054*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.032)
Teenagers 0.132*** -0.104** -0.017
(0.043) (0.044) (0.022)
Students 0.136*** -0.132*** 0.005
(0.039) (0.042) (0.022)
Adults 0.186* -0.285*** 0.077**
(0.096) (0.097) (0.039)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard
errors in parentheses. All reported estimates are from Probit regressions.
The marginal effects of Age and Female are calculated for each regression,
and are evaluated at the mean of each age group. Age is the reported age of
the subject, and treated as a continuous variable. The results remain quan-
titatively similar if additional control variables are included. The number of
observations differ to those reported in Table I due to missing entries. The
observations from sixteen subjects are dropped, as we were unable to cate-
gorise them into either one of the three behavioural types. Full regressions
given in Table VI, Appendix B.
Table III: Marginal Effect - Determinants of Behavioural Type
Observation 1. (Development of Behavioural Types) There is a non–linear relationship be-
tween egalitarianism and age. Age reduces egalitarianism in Children, Teenagers and Students, but
increases egalitarianism in Adults. The inverse holds for altruism.
Support. Combining the Weak and Strong subtypes from Figure 2a, the percentage of egalitar-
ian types is highest for Children (76.1%). Initially, this percentage falls with the subjects’ age, being
smaller in Teenagers and Students. However, it then increases in Adults. This indicates a ‘U–Shaped’
relationship, as observed in Figure 2b. In contrast, an inverse ‘U–Shape’ holds for altruistic types,
increasing from Children to Teenagers, peaking for Students, before falling in Adults. Figure 2a also
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Behavioural Type Explanatory Variable Coefficient Estimate Standard Error
Altruistic
Age 0.329*** (0.042)
Age2 0.07 (0.064)
Female -0.005*** (0.001)
Spiteful
Age -0.002** (0.001)
Age2 -0.19 (0.373)
Female -1.548** (0.805)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard
errors in parentheses. The results remain quantitatively similar if additional control
variables are included. The observations from sixteen subjects are dropped, as we
were unable to categorise them into either one of the three behavioural types.
Egalitarian Types are taken as the baseline. Included variables are identical to
those in Table VI.
Table IV: Multinomial Logit Estimates - Determinants of Behavioural Type
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(b) Percentage of Behavioural Types
Note: For Figure 2a, we were unable to classify sixteen subjects into one of the five behavioural types. Figure 2b
plots the combined percentage of weak and strong classifications for each behavioural type for each age group.
Figure 2: Behavioural Types by Age
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(a) The Marginal Effect of Age
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(b) The Marginal Effect of Being Female
Egalitarian Altruistic Spiteful
Note: The x axis plots the age group at which the marginal effect is evaluated at. In Figure 3a, the y axis plots the
marginal effect of age on the probability of being classified into each of the behavioural types. In Figure 3b, the y
axis plots the effect of Female on the probability of being classified into each of the behavioural types. Marginal
effects estimates are given in Table III. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3: Behavioural Types - Marginal Effects
reveals that the majority of Adults ’ preference types (78.3%) can be categorised as Strong. This
compares to just 45.4% of Children, 42.2% of Teenagers and 34.4% of Students. Examining the
relationship parametrically, Table III shows the estimated marginal effect of age on the probability
of being classified as one of the behavioural type for each age group. It outlines how age has a
negative effect on the probability that a dictator is categorised as an egalitarian type for Children,
Teenagers and Students, but has a positive effect for Adults. This is shown graphically in Figure 3.
The log–odds estimates in Table IV corroborate the marginal effect estimates from the Probit models.
Observation 2. (Gender Differences) Females are more likely to be classified as egalitarian,
and are less likely to be classified as altruistic, than males. Adult females are more likely to be clas-
sified as a spiteful type than Adult males.
Support. Table III highlights the significant positive marginal effect of being female on being classified
as an egalitarian type for all age groups (p < 0.05 for Children, p < 0.01 for Teenagers and Students,
and p < 0.1 for Adults). Table III also shows that a negative female effect on altruism emerges in
Teenagers and persists into the Adults (p < 0.01 for all age groups except Children). There is a weak
and small negative female effect in spiteful types for Children (p < 0.1) and a positive effect in Adults
(p < 0.05).
Observation 1 highlights how age negatively impacts egalitarianism, but positively impacts altru-
ism, in Children, Teenagers and Students. This replicates the previous work of Fehr et al. (2013), who
report identical results in children aged 8–17. However, the inverse is true for Adults, and through
the inclusion of this age group, we are able to identify both a ‘U–shaped’ relationship between age
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and the proportion of egalitarian types, and an inverted ‘U–shaped’ relationship for the proportion
of altruistic types, that had previously gone unnoticed and appeared linear.
We find no evidence that age reduces spitefulness, as found by Fehr et al. (2013). This is likely due
to the fact that we observe a significantly smaller proportion of Children to be spiteful types (9.1%
compared to 30%) and in line with the findings of Fehr et al. (2013), we find no gender differential in
these types. In contrast to Fehr et al. (2013), and highlighted by Observation 2, we observe a later
onset of gender differences in altruistic types, as we report the differential emerging in Teenagers
rather than in Children. One potential explanation for the observed behaviour is that expectations
about what one ought to do (i.e., the injunctive norm) differ across age groups (see House (2018)
for a recent discussion of how social norms affect prosocial behaviour). For example, it may be that
the 50:50 split is the taught norm in very young children which weakens with age. However, by the
time individuals reach adulthood, both egalitarian as well as altruistic behaviour could be seen as
normative. An interesting avenue for further research that would solidify the U–shape relationship
between age and egalitarianism is to investigate the pro–social behaviour of the elderly.
It is interesting to note that, through the use of the particular constellation of games that we
study, i.e. the inclusion of a test of disadvantageous inequality (Envy Game) in addition to a test of
advantageous inequality (Sharing Game), females are found to be increasingly egalitarian with age.
This contrasts with the conventional finding from standard dictator games, where women are found
to be more generous, i.e. they give more than men (see Croson & Gneezy (2009) for an overview of
the gender differences literature, and Engel (2011) for a meta analysis of dictator game results).
3.2 Group Biases
To examine if dictators condition their behaviour on the receivers’ ethnicity, we conduct pairwise
comparisons of the behavioural patterns of dictators matched to each of the four ethnicities: White,
Arab, Black and East–Asian. As in the previous section, we focus on dictators’ choice patterns across
the three games, rather than considering each game individually. Figure 4 presents the distributions
of the three broad behavioural types for each of the four ethnicities we study, by age group. This
allows for simple within group comparisons.
Table V presents the estimates of marginal effects from Probit regressions, where in each regression
the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the subject has been classified into one
of the behavioural types. In each regression, presented in Table IX, Appendix B, we include the
same variables as those outlined in Section 3.1, along with three additional dummies, Arab, Black,
East Asian, that take values of 1 and 0 otherwise for each of the three ethnicities we examine; White
is taken as the baseline. We further include the interaction of these dummies with age. These are
included in order to identify any ethnicity effects, and how these effects might develop with age.
From each regression we estimate the marginal effect of the ethnicity variables, Arab, East–Asian
and Black, on the probability of being classified into each behavioural type, for each age group. As
outlined above, White observations are taken as the baseline. The estimates are presented graphically
in Figure 5.
Observation 3. (Group Dependent Behavioural Types) Children, Teenagers and Students are
least likely to be an egalitarian and spiteful type, but most likely to be an altruistic type, when the
receiver is Black. The Adults’ behavioural type is unaffected by the receivers’ ethnicity.
Support. Figure 4 highlights how, for all age groups the distribution of types is relatively stable
across all ethnicites. The only notable exception is when the receiver is Black : for all age groups,
except the Adults, the percentage of subjects classified as being egalitarian is smallest when the re-
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Note: We were unable to classify sixteen subjects into one of the behavioural types.
Figure 4: Behavioural Types by Age Group and the Receivers’ Ethnicity
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ceiver is Black. The inverse is true for altruism, with altruists being the most prevalent type when
the receiver is Black for all age groups except the Adults.
The estimates in Table V support this observation formally: when the receiver is Black, the
Children, Teenagers and Students are less likely to be egalitarian, more likely to be altruistic in
comparison to when the receiver is White. The receivers’ ethnicity has no impact on the any of the
marginal effects for the Adults. The marginal effects of all other ethnicities are estimated not to be
significant for all age groups. The marginal effects are shown graphically in Figure 5.
Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
Marginal Effect: Arab E.Asian Black Arab E.Asian Black Arab E.Asian Black
Children -0.003 0.027 -0.192*** 0.016 -0.052 0.242*** -0.019 0.065 -0.066*
(0.058) (0.057) (0.073) (0.048) (0.042) (0.07) (0.035) (0.052) (0.038)
Teenagers -0.003 0.042 -0.189*** 0.021 -0.071 0.278*** -0.019 0.018 -0.082***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.063) (0.059) (0.057) (0.063) (0.032) (0.035) (0.026)
Students -0.002 0.047 -0.161*** 0.019 -0.066 0.255*** -0.019 -0.011 -0.091***
(0.056) (0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.06) (0.056) (0.032) (0.038) (0.029)
Adults 0.003 0.074 -0.073 -0.002 0.027 0.18 -0.008 -0.063 -0.066
(0.135) (0.135) (0.132) (0.146) (0.146) (0.139) (0.059) (0.059) (0.047)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard errors in parentheses. The reported marginal
effects are estimated from the regressions given in Table IX, Appendix B, evaluated at the mean for each age group.
The results remain quantitatively similar if additional control variables are included. White receivers are taken as the
baseline.
Table V: Marginal Effects - Identity and Behavioural Type
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Note: The x axis plots the age group at which the marginal effects are evaluated. The y axis plots the marginal
effect of the receivers’ ethnicity on the probability of being classified into each of the behavioural types. The
estimated marginal effects are given in Table V, and are evaluated at the mean. Vertical bars represent 95%
confidence intervals. The Spain treatment is taken as the baseline.
Figure 5: Behavioural Type and the Receivers’ Ethnicity - Marginal Effects
Observation 3 provides evidence of positive discrimination in Children, Teenagers and Students
expressed uniquely towards Black receivers. This finding seemingly contrasts with a prevalent result
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in this literature, in which we typically observe in–group favoritism and out–group discrimination.10
One explanation for why we do not observe in–group favouritism is that simple physical cues
and references to a foreign country may not have been enough to induce a sense of identity. This
explanation is consistent with the results of Brewer & Silver (2000). Further, as has been previously
discussed, all our ethnicity manipulations would be considered to be an out–group by Fehr et al.
(2008, 2013).11
Alternatively, the observed behaviour could be a result of a social desirability bias: subjects may
want to be perceived as behaving in a social desirable manner, and thus behave more altruistically
towards those they perceive as being the most in need. This, however, would not explain why the
Adults do not respond altruistically to Black receivers in the same manner that the Children do. A
social desirability bias is likely to be most prevalent in Adults, who are more likely to be sensitive to
normative pressures, and least prevalent in Children, who are likely to be unaware of such norms. As
speculated by (Baker, 2015), negative prejudices towards the out–group may not necessarily produce
animosity. For example, he finds that white Americans are more positive about giving aid when
the recipient is of African descent in comparison to those of Eastern–European descent, despite the
individuals having similar material needs. Paternalistic behaviour, in the form of altruism towards
out–group members, can emerge when subjects feel warmly toward groups they assume to be lacking
in a capacity to act. However, as with the other potential explanations, this doesn’t seem to be the
case for Adults.12
4 Conclusion
We report evidence of a ‘U–shaped’ relationship between social preferences and age, with egalitari-
anism found first to diminish with age, but then to increase as individuals grow older. The inverse
U–shaped’ relationship is true for altruism. These observations contribute to the literature on the
development of social preferences, as previous findings that do not include adults in the analysis
had suggested egalitarianism decreases with age, whilst altruism becomes more prevalent. This is
important, as altruism has been argued to be a prerequisite for ‘smooth’ workplace interactions (Fehr
et al., 2013), being required for individuals to accept inequalities in the workplace. Therefore, our
finding that altruism becomes less prevalent in adulthood may have implications for understanding
what motivates different age groups in the workplace, particularly in relation to salary disparities.
The differences in behaviour across age groups could be attributed to income differences. For
example, Adults earn more money than all other age groups and, as a consequence, payoffs earned in
the experiment constitute a relatively smaller amount of the income they have available. However,
such an income effect might predict that Adults would behave in a more altruistic way than other
age groups, as the choices in all the games that make the recipient better off are relatively less costly.
This is not what we observe.
By varying the receivers’ ethnicity, our paper also addresses recent behavioural theories of dis-
crimination that indicate that social preferences are group–contingent. In contrast to previous studies
that examine an interpersonal sense of identity, we report evidence of paternalism towards the out–
group, rather than preferential treatment of the in–group, when utilising a broader, more collective
10In a meta–analysis of 77 lab studies published in economics, Lane (2016) reports that 93% of these studies report
evidence of in–group favouritism.
11It is possible that the parochialism manipulation may not have been strong enough to induce the group effects
observed in some of the previous literature, and other ethnic group cues such as language might have been more
effective (see for example Esseily et al. (2016))
12Appendix B shows that our results are robust to the potential issue of multiple hypothesis testing.
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sense of identity. This is particularly strong in Children, Teenagers and Students. However, out–
group favouritism is not ubiquitous. It is only observed in interactions with Black foreign receivers,
but not in interactions with East–Asian or Arab foreign receivers.
That Children favour Black foreign receivers, but not the other ethnic groups, is particularly
striking given that they could only infer differences through appearance. Although not biased in
favour of the in–group as is typically found, the finding that children are both aware and sensitive to
the ethnic appearance characteristics of others is in line with previous findings in the developmental
psychology literature (Lam et al., 2011).
Our findings highlight the importance of studying social preferences from both an early age and in
later life. As social preferences can enhance efficiency in many workplace interactions, understanding
how they develop over the life cycle is important for understanding how socialisation can impact
preferences over outcomes. With the working population growing older, and workplaces becoming
more diverse, understanding the interaction between social preferences, age and identity is therefore
important for the design of institutions and their associated incentives in many societies.
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A Experimental Material
A.1 Recruitment Procedures
A.1.1 Spanish Receivers
The main part of the experiment was conducted in the city of Granada, Spain. Granada is a
southern city of Spain composed of predominantly people who are Caucasian (white) and catholic
in their religious beliefs. There is a growing minority of Arabs and Muslims. Granada’s economy is
dedicated mainly to tourism, (through the attractions of the Alhambra Palace and the Sierra Nevada)
and agriculture. It has a population of 236,000.
We recruited Children and Teenagers from six different schools in the city. All classes within the
schools had between 20 and 35 students, both in the elementary and high schools. The Students were
recruited from the University of Granada, which has a student body of 68,000. In our experiment,
participants came from different faculties of the University: the Faculty of Economics and Business,
the Faculty of Education Sciences and the Faculty of Humanities.
Half of the Adults were recruited from the parent body of the Children, with the other half being
employees of the University of Granada. The average age was 45 years and 57 percent of the adult
sample holds a university degree.
A.1.2 Chinese Receivers
Receivers from China were recruited in Changde, Hunan province, located in South Central China.
The population composition of Changde is more homogeneous than that of east coast cities with
similar sized populations and economies because few residents are immigrants. We chose institutions
with individuals from urban as well as rural backgrounds, to control for potential Hukou differences
between groups. See Afridi et al. (2015) for a discussion of the differences between Hukou groups.
Children were recruited from an elementary school located at an intersection between urban and
rural districts of Changde. The school consisted of 18 classes with over 1,000 students, with 70% of
the students being from a rural area. To match with Spanish participants, we recruited 50 students
from a fourth grade class with an equal gender composition, and an age range from 9 to 11.
Similar to our recruiting protocol for the Children, we recruited 48 Teenagers aged 13 to 15 from
a ninth grade high school class. This school included 30 senior high school classes and 24 junior high
school classes with a total of over 3,000 students. Students were recruited from a large undergraduate
class in a local college: Hunan University of Arts and Sciences. It has over 23,000 undergraduates,
and most of them are local residents or from nearby areas within the Hunan province. In total, 50
Students participated in our study aged between 18 and 24 years old.
Lastly, we recruited 23 Adults (teachers) aged 35 to 59 from another elementary school. This
school is considered to be the most competitive elementary school in Changde, where 86% teachers
have at least a junior college degree.
A.1.3 Moroccan and Senegalese Receivers
In Morocco, the experiment took place in Tangier, the biggest city in North–Western Africa, and
located on the Mediterranean coast. In Senegal the experiment took place in Dakar, the capital and
largest city of the country. In the Human Development Ranking these countries are, respectively, in
positions 126 (Morocco) and 170 (Senegal) of 188 countries. Residents are predominantly Muslim in
both countries (Morocco 99.5%; Senegal 90%).
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With respect to the field work, in both countries we had the full support of an international NGO
(Alliance for Solidarity) both before and after the experiment. The NGO requested the permits
required for the experiment and completed the translation of the documents (instructions, survey)
into the local languages (Arabic and French). They were also in charge of recruitment (following our
instructions). Subjects of equal gender composition were recruited from a homogeneous population
in low income schools that require their students to wear school uniforms. School uniforms were
required as we didn’t want clothing to be indicative of potential income differences. The NGO also
provided staff members to run the experiment.
In Tangier we recruited 47 Children and 54 Teenagers from two elementary schools situated in
suburban areas. In Dakar, 33 Children and 49 Teenagers were recruited from the outskirts of Dakar.
Students in both countries were recruited from undergraduate classes in two local colleges.
Finally, we recruited 48 Adults. In Tangier the adults were part of the staff of a school, as well
as parents of the primary school. In Dakar, they belonged to a Neighbourhood Association in the
same area of the Children’s school. The majority of them were women, given that in both cities they
represent the majority of members at this type of association.
A.2 Experimental Instructions
A.2.1 General Comments
Welcome to this experiment. Here you will find the instructions for the tasks you have to fulfill.
There are no right or wrong answers, your identity will not be known at any time and we will use
only the information you provide. The goal of this experiment is to study how people make decisions.
The instructions are very easy and if you follow them carefully you can receive some money. It is
very important that you understand the instructions. If you have any questions, do not hesitate to
raise your hand and ask the experimenter. Besides these questions, any kind of communication is
completely forbidden and you could even be expelled from the experiment.
A.2.2 Specific Instructions – Dictators
This experiment consists of one period. You will be matched with a person from the following group
(see picture).
There are two types of participants: Type A and Type B. You will participate as Type A and
your counterpart (somebody from the picture) will be Type B. You have to make three decisions.
For each decision you have to choose between two allocations of money (Payoff A, Payoff B) with
the first number indicating the payoff to you and the second number indicating the payoff to Type
B. The decisions that you face are shown in the following table.
Left Right
(Payoff A, Payoff B) (Payoff A, Payoff B) Decision
Left–Right
Decision 1 (e5,e5) (e5,e0)
Decision 2 (e5,e5) (e5,e10)
Decision 3 (e5,e5) (e10,e0)
Type B will not make any decisions in this task. They will only be informed about what you
have chosen. Only one of the three decisions will be selected for payment. Earnings will therefore
only depend on your decisions.
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A.2.3 Specific Instructions – Receivers
This experiment consists of one period. You will be matched with a person from the following group
(see picture).
There are two types of participants: Type A and Type B. You will participate as Type B and
your counterpart (somebody from the picture) will be Type A. Type A has to make three decisions.
For each decision Type A has to choose between two allocations of money (Payoff A, Payoff B) with
the first number indicating the payoff to Type A and the second number indicating the payoff to you.
The decisions that Type A faces are shown in the following table.
Left Right
(Payoff A, Payoff B) (Payoff A, Payoff B) Decision
Left–Right
Decision 1 (e5,e5) (e5,e0)
Decision 2 (e5,e5) (e5,e10)
Decision 3 (e5,e5) (e10,e0)
You as Type B will not make any decisions in this task. You will only be informed about what
Type A has chosen. Only one of the three decisions will be selected for payment. Earnings will
therefore only depend on Type As decisions.
19
B Statistical appendix
This section presents tables of the complete Probit regression from Section 3.
B.1 Parametric Analysis
This section presents a number of tables of estimates obtained from Probit regressions, along with
their corresponding marginal effects.
Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
(i) (ii) (iii)
Age -0.1645*** 0.187*** -0.0213
(0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0302)
Age*Age 0.0025*** -0.0027*** -0.0002
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006)
Female*Age 0.0052 -0.0153* 0.039*
(0.009) (0.0093) (0.0204)
Female 0.252 -0.0325 -0.7289*
(0.2049) (0.2138) (0.3729)
In–group 0.0869 -0.1677 0.1807
(0.1184) (0.1222) (0.1661)
Constant 1.8214*** -2.3301*** -1.0575***
(0.2664) (0.2853) (0.3621)
Obs. 633 633 633
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. All reported estimates are from Probit re-
gressions. The results remain quantitatively similar if additional control
variables are included. The number of observations differ to those re-
ported in Table I due to missing entries. The observations from sixteen
subjects are dropped, as we were unable to categorise them into either
one of the three behavioural types.
Table VI: Probit Estimates - Determinants of Behavioural Type
C Robustness Checks
As we examine the data for a number of treatment effects, with 60 hypothesis tests in total (24 in
Table III and 36 in Table V) some of the statistical significance that we observe may be an artefact
of multiple hypothesis testing (MHT). To account for this, we adjust the calculated p–values used
to support Observations 1–3 using the Holm–Bonferonni (HB) correction procedure. We treat all
60 tested hypotheses as being part of the same ‘family’ of tests, and therefore apply the strictest
possible correction. This is one of the most standard procedures used to correct for multiplicity in
the sciences, and we use this procedure over the more conservative Bonferroni procedure because of
its reduced false negative rate, and thus, increased power (Holm, 1979).
Table X presents the p–values that remain significant once the correction has been applied. The
first column provides information on the Table the original p–value is taken from, the second column
outlines which Observation the p–value is used to support. The third column shows the dependent
variable and the fourth column gives information on the estimated marginal effect. The fifth column
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Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
(i) (ii) (iii)
Marginal Effect of Age:
Children -0.028*** 0.025*** 0.000
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Teenagers -0.029*** 0.031*** -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Students -0.021*** 0.025*** -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
Adults 0.02*** -0.022*** -0.001
(0.006) (0.007) (0.002)
Marginal Effect of Female:
Children 0.103** -0.052 -0.057
(0.051) (0.043) (0.036)
Teenagers 0.137*** -0.103** -0.03
(0.053) (0.053) (0.026)
Students 0.129*** -0.119** -0.009
(0.047) (0.05) (0.026)
Adults 0.118 -0.203 0.09
(0.121) (0.125) (0.059)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard
errors in parentheses. All reported estimates are from Probit regressions.
The marginal effects of Age and Female are calculated for each regression,
and are evaluated at the mean for each age group. Age is the reported age
of the subject, and treated as a continuous variable. The observations from
sixteen subjects are dropped, as we were unable to categorise them into
either one of the three behavioural types.
Table VII: Marginal Effects with Additional Controls - Determinants of Behavioural Type
details the age group the p–value relates to. The sixth column gives the original p–value, and the
final column the Holm–Bonferonni corrected p–value.
As an example, consider the first row of Table X. The p–value is taken from Table III, relates
to Observation 1, the dependent variable is the egalitarian type and the marginal effect the p–value
relates to is the marginal effect of age. It was calculated for Children, had a value of p < 0.001 and
once corrected is still less than 0.001, and remains highly significant.
As can be seen from the corrected p–values presented in Table X, Observation 1 can be clearly
distinguished from Type 1 error, with the estimated marginal effect of age remaining statistically
significant at the p < 0.001 level for both the egalitarian and altrustic types. However, Observation
2 is not as robust, with only a gender difference in Students remaining once all p–values have been
corrected for. Observation 3 is also found to be robust to criticisms of multiplicity, with all age
groups except Adults being more altruistic when the receiver is Black, as originally observed. Thus,
we conclude that our main observations are unlikely to be the result of MHT and appear to be robust
to such criticisms.
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Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
(i) (ii) (iii)
Marginal Effect of Age:
Children -0.037*** 0.033*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Teenagers -0.033*** 0.036*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Students -0.025*** 0.029*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Adults 0.02*** -0.02*** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Marginal Effect of Female:
Children 0.096** -0.045 -0.054*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.032)
Teenagers 0.131*** -0.103** -0.018
(0.043) (0.043) (0.022)
Students 0.135*** -0.131*** 0.004
(0.039) (0.041) (0.022)
Adults 0.167* -0.245*** 0.073**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.037)
Note: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard
errors in parentheses. All reported estimates are from Probit regressions.
The marginal effects of Age and Female are calculated for each regression
for each age group. Age is the reported age of the subject, and treated as a
continuous variable. The results remain quantitatively similar if additional
control variables are included. The observations from sixteen subjects are
dropped, as we were unable to categorise them into either one of the three
behavioural types.
Table VIII: Average Marginal Effects - Determinants of Behavioural Type
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Dependent Variable: Egalitarian Type Altruistic Type Spiteful Type
(i) (ii) (iii)
Age -0.164*** 0.182*** 0.009
(0.024) (0.025) (0.037)
Age× Age 0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female× 0.004 -0.013 0.041***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.008)
Female 0.28*** -0.104*** -0.767
(0.017) (0.021) (0.00)
Arab -0.014 0.086** -0.156***
(0.04) (0.042) (0.054)
E.Asian 0.067* -0.341*** 0.737***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.092)
Black -0.627*** 0.838*** -0.364***
(0.028) (0.03) (0.098)
Arab× Age 0.00 -0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
E.Asian × Age 0.003 0.009 -0.041
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Black × Age 0.009 -0.008 -0.044
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 1.906 -2.413 -1.249
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Obs. 633 633 633
Note: ***,**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Standard
errors in parentheses. All reported estimates are from Probit regressions.
The results remain quantitatively similar if additional control variables are
included. The number of observations differ to those reported in Table I due
to missing entries. The observations from sixteen subjects are dropped, as
we were unable to categorise them into one of the three types.
Table IX: Probit Estimates - Identity and Behavioural Types
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Table Observation Dep. Variable Marginal Effect Age Group p–value Corrected p–value
Table III Observation 1
Egalitarian Type
Age
Children 0.000 0.000
Teenagers 0.000 0.000
Students 0.000 0.000
Adults 0.000 0.000
Altruistic Type
Children 0.000 0.000
Teenagers 0.000 0.000
Students 0.000 0.000
Adults 0.000 0.000
Table III Observation 2 Egalitarian Type Female Students 0.0006 0.0288
Table V Observation 3 Altruistic Type Black
Children 0.0005 0.025
Teenagers 0.000 0.0004
Students 0.000 0.0003
Note: The first column provides information on the Table the p–value is taken from, the second column
outlines which Observation the p–value is used to support, the third column the dependent variable and the
fourth column gives information on the explanatory variable. The fifth column details the age group the p–value
relates to. The sixth column gives the original p–value, and the final column the Holm–Bonferonni corrected
p–value. All p–values are 2 sided.
Table X: Robustness Check – Holm–Bonferroni Corrected p–values
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